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Introduction
Economists and policymakers have been ex-
pressing concern of late about the prospects for
U.S. economic growth. Foremost among their
concerns is the recent decline in U.S. saving.
The net national saving rate, which averaged
8.5 and 4.7 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, re-
spectively, registered an abysmal 1.7 percent in
1991 (see table 1). Many fear that continued low
saving will constrain investment and cause
productivity to stall in the future.
The total amount of saving is determined by
several factors. Among them are the degree of
uncertainty about future economic outcomes,
the extent of foresight exercised by households
in anticipating future needs, the demographic
composition of the population, the complete-
ness of financial and insurance markets, and the
thrust of government economic policies. Current
projections suggest that two particular factors
will play an important role in determining the
future course of U.S. saving: the demographic
transition currently under way and the chroni-
cally increasing costs of health care. Both may
pose serious obstacles to achieving greater
saving in the future.
Debate continues on how best to reform Social
Security and Medicare to meet these challenges.
Further, many economists recommend greater fis-
cal stimulus by way of income-tax cuts for achiev-
ing faster rates of economic growth. Although the
likely impact of these policies on national saving
is obviously important, little direct attention has
been paid to it, probably because these policies
are not motivated primarily by a desire to influ-
ence saving.
Economic theory suggests that individuals' con-
sumption and saving decisions are intimately re-
lated to the amount of their available resources —
their net worth and expected future income. For
an individual, the net availability of resources de-
pends, in part, on the size of the fiscal burden im-
posed by government tax and transfer policies.
Thus, measuring the impact on saving of a given
policy change requires prior estimation of the
policy-induced changes in the fiscal burdens fac-
ing members of different generations. This can be
done by using generational accounting. Else-
where, we have used this method to explore the
impact of alternative fiscal policies on U.S. saving
rates.
1 This Economic Review applies the same
• 1 See Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1992a,b) and Kotlikoff (1992).
In addition, see Office of Management and Budget (1992), chapter 26.TABLE 1
Saving Rates in the United States
(percent of net national product)









































NOTE: Personal saving is defined as saving by households. Private saving is
defined as personal saving plus saving by businesses. National saving is
defined as private saving plus saving by the U.S. government.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the Economic Report of the Presi-
dent, February 1992, various tables.
method to examine the likely impact of alterna-





As mentioned earlier, policy-induced changes
in the fiscal burdens facing different generations
affect their net resource availabilities and, hence,
their consumption. As a simple illustration, con-
sider an economy in which individuals choose
consumption profiles to maximize remaining
lifetime utility denoted by
subject to the budget constraint
T- a T-a T-a
(2)
t=o t=o 1=0
Here, u(.) denotes a single-period utility func-
tion and p a time preference factor. The individ-
ual's current age is denoted by a, and T stands
• 2 The appendix contains a more detailed account of the method
and data used.
for the maximum age of life; R= 1 / (1+r), with
r being an exogenously given rate of return on
capital; Ct stands for consumption, Wt for wages,
and Tt for net payments — taxes net of transfer
receipts — made to the government during
period t. The right side of equation (2) equals the
present value of resources, PVR0, where the first
term, A 0, is current nonhuman wealth, the second
term is human wealth, and the third term is the
present value of net payments made to the gov-
ernment over the remaining lifetime — the indi-
vidual's generational account.
Consider the special case where u(Ct) equals
log (C,), where there are only two periods in a
lifetime (youth and old age), and where individ-
uals possess no assets when young and work
only during the first period. In this case, it is easy
to verify that optimum consumptions when






where subscripts y and o designate values
when young and old, respectively, and super-
script * denotes optimum value. Reasonable
values of P , (P < 1), yield propensities to con-
sume out of PVR that rise with age. Such pro-
pensities are qualitatively consistent with the
empirical evidence. In the two-period example,
letting Wy = 90, Wo = 0, Ty =To=20,R= 0.5,
and P = 1 produces PVRy = PVR o = 60. The
capital stock is 40 and total income per period is
130. Of the total (170) disposable resources
each period, the government consumes 40, Cy
= 30, Co' = 60, and saving by the young is 40.
Now consider a tax-cut policy: The govern-
ment continues to consume 40, but reduces To
by 5 for just one period. The debt so generated
is serviced by increasing To to 25 in every sub-
sequent period, the additional tax being used to
pay interest on the initial borrowing of 5. The
generation that is old when the policy change
occurs enjoys a reduced tax liability and, follow-
ing the consumption rule, increases its con-
sumption by 5, to 65. Saving in this period is
thus depressed to 35. Clearly, if Ty, rather than
To, had been reduced by 5, saving would have
fallen to 37.5 in the first period. Further, if govern-
ment spending had declined simultaneously with
the decrease in To, saving would have remainedTABLE 2
Current and Projected Population
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a. P » total population, LF = labor force.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the Social Security Administration's
Alternative II Population Projections. Data on the labor force were obtained
from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
unchanged; it would have increased if the tax
cut had instead been bestowed on the young.
The impact on saving thus depends not only
on the amount of the tax cut, but also on who re-
ceives it. In addition, it hinges on whether and by
how much government consumption spending is
altered. Estimates of policy-induced changes in
the net tax liabilities for each generation provided
by generational accounting can, therefore, be
combined with estimates of propensities to con-
sume out of resources to assess the resulting
change in aggregate saving. The saving estimates
reported in this paper are based on a model in
which individuals' economic life spans extend
from age 18 through 90. Age-specific consump-
tion propensities estimated from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure Survey are
used in the calculations.
Three caveats must be considered when eval-
uating the results from experiments based on such
a procedure. First, this procedure ignores incentive
and price effects of policy changes. For example,
policies that alter marginal tax rates may introduce
a further indirect effect on saving by causing some
individuals to revise their labor supply decisions.
The model also ignores effects arising from
changes in factor prices, which may be large espe-
cially if policy shifts are expected to be temporary.
In general, however, these effects will reinforce
the direction of change in saving rates induced by
the income effects described above. For exam-
ple, policies that boost saving rates by redistrib-
uting resources away from older generations
will tend to increase the capital stock and,
hence, to reduce interest rates and raise wage
rates. These factor price changes will reinforce
the redistribution of resources away from older
generations and further augment saving rates.
Estimates from policy simulations in Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987) suggest that such wage and
interest-rate changes occur only slowly. Because
of discounting, the long-run impact of factor
price changes on the present value of resources,
and thus on saving, is likely to be small.
Second, if the change in policy is partially
anticipated, experiments that assume the change
to be unanticipated will overstate the saving im-
pact. Third, some policy changes affect the de-
gree of uncertainty about future economic
events, especially regarding income and govern-
ment transfer receipts, and thus may influence
households' propensities to consume out of
resources. In general, consumption propensities
will be lower if policy changes increase the de-
gree of uncertainty regarding future economic
outcomes.
3 As yet, however, there exist no reli-
able estimates of how changes in uncertainty
regarding future income affect average and mar-





In the United States, the baby boom generations
will begin to retire in about 20 years. According
to table 2, individuals above age 65 currently
make up about 12 percent of the population. By
2030, however, their proportion will grow to
about 20 percent. Table 2 also shows that the
proportion of young individuals in the popula-
tion is projected to decline over the same
period. The last column of the table reveals that
as the baby boomers begin to retire, the ratio of
individuals not in the labor force to those who
are in it may be expected to increase from its
current level of 1.12 to 1.15 by 2020, and to at-
tain levels greater than 1.20 in the following dec-
ades. The need to support a growing number of
dependents will undoubtedly reduce the ability
of future working generations to save.
3 See Carroll (1992).TABLE 3
Changes in the Net National Saving










































































Anticipating these demographic trends, the
1983 amendments to the Social Security law
sought to switch from a pay-as-you-go system to
one funded by 1) raising current Social Security
taxes, 2) gradually increasing retirement ages in
future years, and 3) subjecting future Social Secur-
ity benefits to income taxation.
4 As a result, the
Social Security Trust Fund has recently begun
accumulating annual surpluses. Although these
surpluses are earmarked for financing increased
benefit payouts as the baby boomers begin retiring
early in the next century, they may also be induc-
ing larger deficits on the rest of the government's
budget. Recently, proposals have been made for
reducing Social Security and income taxes to pro-
vide a tax break for the middle class and to spur
consumption demand to lift the economy out of
its sluggish pace.
5
The proposals for Social Security and income-
tax cuts point to the possibility that fiscal policies
negating the purpose of the Social Security sur-
plus may be adopted. Since the government's
finances must obey an intertemporal budget
constraint, a tax cut today will compel a com-
pensating change in revenues or outlays, either
now or in future years. We therefore investigate
the savings impact of the following hypothetical
policies: 1) A 20 percent cut in Social Security
taxes through 2020 coupled with either a) higher
Social Security taxes thereafter, or b) reduced
Social Security benefit payments thereafter, or
c) higher income taxation thereafter; 2) a dis-
sipation of Social Security surpluses through
higher government consumption to be replaced
with either a) higher Social Security taxes after
year 2020, or b) reduced Social Security benefits
after year 2020; and 3) an 8 percent cut in in-
come taxes until 2020 coupled with a) higher in-
come taxes thereafter, or b) contemporaneous
reductions in government consumption spend-
ing equaling the reduction in revenue.
6
Each of these policies maintains intertemporal
balance in the federal government's budget. That
is, the loss in revenue from the initial tax cuts or
spending increases is made up, in present value,
by larger revenue from future tax hikes or future
benefit cuts. Each of these policies imposes a
unique set of gains and losses on different genera-
tions. As a result, each policy may be expected to
have a distinct impact on current and future
saving rates.
Columns 1 through 3 in table 3 show the im-
pact on saving rates of Social Security tax-cut
policies.
7 To understand the implications of
policy (la), which reduces Social Security taxes
until the year 2020 and increases them there-
after, consider the case of the relatively older
generations, those aged 35 and older in 1990.
• 4 See U.S. Congress (1983).
• 5 At this writing, the Clinton Administration is considering income-
tax cuts for middle-income Americans, although combined with increases
for the rich.
• 6 An 8 percent cut in income taxes results in the same amount ot
revenue loss as a 20 percent cut in Social Security taxes.
• 7 All numbers in tables 3 and 4 indicate percentage-point changes.These generations' present value of resources
(PVRs) are larger because they benefit from the
immediate Social Security tax cuts, but are not
much exposed to the higher Social Security taxes
upon retirement after 2020. The net positive effect
on their resources of the reduced Social Security
taxes will increase their consumption. For some of
the slightly younger generations, too, the present-
value gain from the immediate tax cuts will be
greater than the present-value loss from the higher
taxes 30 years later. Their resources, and hence
their consumption, will also be larger.
Those younger generations who will not be
in the work force for most of the years before
2020, but will face the higher future taxation,
will suffer a net loss in their resources. Most of
these individuals, however, were not in the
work force in 1990 and will not engage in con-
sumption for a number of years thereafter.
Thus, older generations will experience a gain,
and younger generations a loss, in their PVRs.
Given that the old have larger propensities to
consume, this pattern of changes in the PVRs
will induce larger aggregate consumption.
Hence, saving rates will be lower. Table 3
shows that policy (la) reduces current and fu-
ture saving rates by between 0.40 and 0.67 per-
centage point. In contrast, policy (lb) exposes
the older generations to reduced Social Security
benefits upon retirement. Thus, the increase in
their PVRs and, therefore, in their consumption
will not be as large as under policy (la). This ex-
plains why the reduction in saving rates under
this policy is not as large as that under policy
(la). The saving-rate reductions for policy (lb)
range between 0.08 and 0.17 percentage point.
Policy (lc) involves an income-tax hike after
the year 2020. Unlike Social Security taxes,
which fall exclusively on wage and salary in-
comes, part of the revenue from income taxa-
tion comes from taxation of capital income,
which accrues mainly to older and retired gen-
erations. As a result, the increase in the PVRs of
generations that are of working age in 1990 will
not be as large as with higher future Social Se-
curity taxation. This induces a comparatively
smaller increase in these generations' consump-
tion and, hence, a smaller decline in saving
rates. Saving-rate reductions due to this policy
range between 0.34 and 0.56 percentage point.
Columns 4 and 5 in table 3 show the impact
of policies (2a) and (2b), respectively. Here, the
annual Social Security Trust Fund surpluses are
dissipated through higher government spend-
ing. To compensate, policy (2a) raises Social
Security taxes, while policy (2b) reduces Social
Security benefits after the year 2020. Both
policies lower current and future saving rates
because the direct negative effect due to higher
government consumption expenditure is not
fully offset by the lower consumption expenditure
of generations whose PVRs are reduced as a result
of higher future taxes (policy [2a]) or lower future
Social Security benefits (policy [2b]). Policy (2a)
lowers saving rates by about 0.9 percentage point
in 1990. Future saving-rate reductions are lower
because Social Security surpluses that are available
for dissipation decline gradually as the baby boom
generations approach retirement age. Again, be-
cause older generations escape higher future taxa-
tion under policy (2a) but receive lower benefits
under policy (2b), the decline in saving rates is
greater for policy (2a).
The last two columns of table 3 show the
effects on saving rates from income-tax-cut pol-
icies. Under policy (3a), income taxes are in-
creased after the year 2020. This policy is similar
to the Social Security tax-cut policy (la). Saving
is reduced because older generations benefit
from the immediate cut in income taxes, but are
not alive when income taxes are increased in the
future. Saving-rate reductions under this policy
range between 0.41 and 0.66 percentage point.
Under policy (3b), government spending is re-
duced in each year by the amount of revenue lost
from the income-tax cut. The direct effect of the
expenditure reduction in increasing the national
saving rate is partially offset by greater consump-
tion induced by lower taxes. This policy neverthe-
less boosts saving rates by about 0.6 percentage
point in the years immediately after 1990. The in-
creases in saving rates are lower for years further
in the future because generations that gain the
most from current tax-rate reductions then enter
age groups with high consumption propensities.
Thus, the direct gain in saving due to government
spending reductions is increasingly offset by
higher private consumption in later years.
The impact on saving rates of the policies
considered here is relatively small. The results
show that policies involving current tax cuts or
current spending increases that are paid for by
future tax hikes will affect saving rates adversely.
Tax-cut policies that involve contemporaneous
reductions in government spending will in-
crease saving rates, however.
Medicare Policies
The high and rising cost of health care provision
provides a second cause for concern about future
saving. The fraction of GDP accounted for by
health care expenditures grew from about 6.0TABLE 4
Changes in the Net National
Saving Rate Due to Reduced






















percent in 1965 to 13.9 percent in 1992. Older
individuals spend more on health care than do
younger persons.
8 An increasing share of older
people in the population will be a major demand-
side factor causing future increases in the price of
medical services. Supply-side factors such as faster
wage gains relative to other sectors, technological
advances that are skill and labor intensive and
therefore costlier, and shortages of skilled person-
nel are also likely to contribute to higher health
care costs in the future. If current laws and prac-
tices continue, health care expenditure as a per-
centage of GDP is projected to climb to 32.0
percent by 2030.
9 Policy measures aimed at curb-
ing these escalations will surely be adopted in the
future, but the alacrity with which they are
adopted and prove successful may be crucial in
determining the outcome for saving rates.
Several proposals for health care reform and,
in particular, for curbing future increases in
Medicare and Medicaid spending are currently
being debated. We do not explore the impact of
alternative ways to reform the health care sys-
tem, but rather examine the effects on saving of
reducing the growth rate of Medicare and Medi-
caid spending to equal that of the overall econo-
my by a target year in the future. Under the
framework adopted here, the current saving rate
(in 1990) is assumed to incorporate individuals'
expectations regarding the path of Medicaid and
Medicare expenditures over the coming decade.
The policy experiment thus refers to the
effect on the saving rate of an announcement
by the government of a credible plan for reduc-
ing the growth rate of these expenditures by a
specified year. In this experiment, the compen-
sating change is a reduction in fiscal burdens for
all future generations. We consider the impact
on saving rates of three alternative dates by
which the growth of Medicare and Medicaid
spending would be reduced to equal the overall
economic growth rate.
Table 4 shows that credible plans to reduce
the growth rates of Medicare and Medicaid ex-
penditures soon would have a substantial posi-
tive impact on saving rates. A plan for reducing
their growth by 1995, for example, provides a
relatively large and positive impulse to current
and future national saving. In this case, national
saving rates increase by more than 1.2 percent
immediately, and by even larger amounts in the
early years of the next century. The impact on
saving rates is greater, the earlier the target year
for bringing these expenditures under control.
Reducing the growth rate of Medicare and Medi-
caid spending may be expected to produce by
far the largest positive impacts on saving rates.
III. Conclusion
This paper uses the method of generational ac-
counting to investigate the impact on saving
rates of Social Security and income-tax-cut poli-
cies. In exploring the saving-rate changes under
alternative financing arrangements for these tax
cuts, we estimate that the effects are not very
large. Saving rates are affected adversely under
all alternatives that do not involve simultaneous
reductions in government consumption. In addi-
tion, we find that a decrease in the rate of
growth of Medicare and Medicaid expenditures,
coupled with a reduction in payment burdens
on future generations, is likely to have relatively
large positive effects on current and future sav-
ing rates in the United States. The increases in
saving rates from such a policy will be larger,
the earlier it is implemented.
8 See U.S. General Accounting Office (1991).
• 9 These projections were obtained from the Health Care Financing









The methodology of generational accounting
was developed for comparing the fiscal burdens
on current and future generations, where each
generation includes individuals of a particular
age and sex. Each generation's generational ac-
count, GA (n), represents the average per capita
lifetime net-payments burden on members of
that generation under the prevailing set of fiscal
policies denoted by jr. The methodology en-
ables a computation of the GAs that would exist
both before and after any contemplated policy
change. The difference in these GAs represents
the change in the present value of resources,
A PVR =GA(n
1)- GA(n
2), accruing to that
generation as a result of the policy change.
The GA (it) for a generation currently living
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Calculations are as of year t, and D is the
maximum possible age, which is assumed to be
90 years. GA (Jt) * k stands for the generational
account under the set of policies, JC, for the gen-
eration born in year k, where t— D< k< t. The
superscript x stands for the generation's sex;
x = male or female. P
x k represents the popula-
tion in year s of the generation of sex x that was
born in year k. Intermediate population projec-
tions constructed by the Social Security Admin-
istration are used in the computations. T
x . k
stands for that generation's average per capita
tax payment/transfer receipt of the z
t
h type in
year 5. Transfer receipts enter into the computa-
tions with a negative sign. Equation (Al) thus
represents the actuarially discounted sum of
average tax payments minus transfer receipts




Here, At t stands for the aggregate tax pay-
ments or transfer receipts of the & type made
by all individuals alive in year t. These aggre-
gates for the various tax/transfer types are com-
puted from the National Income and Product
Accounts. Taxes include labor and capital in-
come taxes, Social Security taxes, indirect taxes,
property taxes, and seigniorage. Transfers cover
Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid benefits,
and welfare benefits such as food stamps, un-
employment insurance, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, and general welfare pay-
ments. The tax and transfer categories are com-
prehensive, including all revenues and transfer
payments undertaken by federal, state, and
local governments.
Rx I stands for the share of taxes/transfers of
type i made by the generation of sex x and age
j in year t relative to the share for a 40-year-old
male in year t. These relative-share profiles by
age and sex for various tax/transfer types are
obtained from the Census Bureau's Survey of In-
come and Program Participation (SIPP) and from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expen-
diture Survey (CES). Projections of future taxes/
transfers assume that the relative-share profiles
will remain unchanged through time.
Future aggregate taxes and transfers will be
larger as the economy grows. Hence, the aggre-
gates for future years are obtained by multiply-
ing the year t aggregates by a growth factor.
The growth rate, gt, chosen for most tax and
transfer categories is 0.75 percent, since this
value is consistent with the average annual rate
of U.S. productivity growth in recent years. The
exceptions are the growth rates selected for
Medicare and Medicaid expenditures. Projected
annual aggregates obtained from the Health
Care Financing Administration are used for
these two categories. Equation (A2) thus com-
putes the aggregate taxes/transfers of type i
that individuals of sex x born in year k expect
to pay/receive in year 5.G U R E 1
Average Propensities to









Equations (Al) and (A2) constitute a procedure
for distributing any given national tax or transfer
aggregate among currently living generations ac-
cording to the per capita relative-share profiles
corresponding to that aggregate. We use the
same procedure to construct APCs for different
generations. For this, we require generation-
specific estimates of total annual consumption,
C
x k's, and of the present values of resources,
PVR*k's.
The C
x k 's are obtained by distributing total
personal consumption expenditures in 1990 ac-
cording to a relative-share profile for total con-
sumption estimated using CES data. The PVR*k's
are estimated as the sum of human and nonhu-
man wealth minus the per capita generational
account for this generation.
1
0 We estimate the
average per capita human wealth level for each
generation as the present discounted value of
that generation's projected per capita labor in-
come. Current per capita labor income is esti-
• 10 The computation and results from the generational accounting
exercise used here are discussed in Budget of the U.S. Government, Fis-
cal Year 1993.
• 11 The share of labor is computed according to the formula sL =
CL(NNP-IT-P), where CL is compensation to employees, NNP is the net
national product, IT is indirect taxes, and P is proprietors' income.
mated by distributing total labor income in 1990
according to its relative-share profile obtained
from SIPP data.
1
1 Future labor incomes are ob-
tained by annually compounding the 1990 labor
incomes at the rate of productivity growth of
0.75 percent. We estimate generation-specific
nonhuman wealth by distributing aggregate
private net worth by age and sex according to a
profile for asset holdings obtained from SIPP
data.
1
2 The age-specific average propensities to
consume are APC
X a = C
x k/PVR
x k, where the
subscript a stands for the generation's age and
equals t— k. The estimated age-specific APCs





Estimating the consumption change arising from
a shift in policy requires computing the product
of the policy-induced change in resources and
the marginal propensity to consume resources
for members of each generation. However, no
reliable empirical estimates of age-specific mar-
ginal propensities to consume exist. Here, all
individuals are assumed to maximize a homo-
thetic utility function. Homotheticity of the util-
ity function implies equal average and marginal
propensities to consume resources. This allows
a substitution of average instead of marginal
propensities to consume resources in the com-
putations. The change in aggregate saving fol-





xk is computed as APC
X a x A PVR
X k.
As formula (A3) shows, only individuals 18
and older are assumed to engage in consump-
tion spending. A change in policy will, of
course, affect the PVRs of individuals who are
less than age 18 in the beginning year, year t.
The changes in the PVR s of generations less
than 18 years of age will, under this assump-
tion, affect aggregate consumption only in years
when these generations are 18 or older. To com-
pute consumption changes for future years,
equation (A3) is applied to cohorts aged 18
through 90 in those years. For each cohort, the
A PVRs applicable in these years are computed as
• 12 Total private net worth in 1990 was $18,573 trillion, according




where r is the rate of interest.
1
3 AC* k =
cohort born in year k is less than 18 years of age
in year 5. To calculate the change in the national
saving rate resulting from a change in policy,
we project future net national product using a
0.75 percent rate of productivity growth. The
annual changes in saving rates are estimated as
A st = A St/NNPt. Policy changes are assumed
to be initiated in 1990. For each of the policies
considered, we estimate Ast for t = 1990
through 2005 and report these for selected years.
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